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IN SEARCH OF PEACE

American Initiatives, 1946-1982

Front Cover:

Seal of the United States affixed to diplomatic treaty

From the beginning of the nuclear age 37 years ago, the Government of the United States and the American people have sensed both the promise of nuclear energy and the menace of nuclear weapons. Many of our finest minds and spirits have addressed nuclear problems in every possible perspective—as problems of morality and technology; of war and peace; as centrifugal and centripetal forces in the social and political life of the international order; as factors of light and of possible doom in the human condition. And, since the time of the Baruch Plan proposals in 1946, the Government of the United States has been committed to an unrelenting search for international agreements that could make it possible for the world to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without risking nuclear war.

The record of the United States Government in this respect is quite extraordinary. Year after year, and against strong resistance, the United States has reiterated the need for international agreements on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, and proposed such agreements on many aspects of the problem—on nuclear test bans and the proliferation of nuclear weapons; on "confidence-building" measures to reduce uncertainty and the risk of surprise attack; agreements to eliminate nuclear weapons from outer space or the Antarctic, and to establish nuclear weapons free zones; agreements to limit and reduce nuclear arms and other arms, too; in short, a whole family of proposals designed to bring nuclear energy and the nuclear weapon under the control of agreed rules for the benefit of mankind.

Sometimes enthusiasts for arms control have thought that arms control agreements could of themselves achieve peace. The bitter experience of the last decade has convinced American opinion that while arms control agreements can be useful elements of a strategy for peace, they are not substitutes for foreign and defense policy. World public order, like public order within a society, is the achievement of a long and sometimes painful struggle. A regime of law sketched out in treaties and charters does not come into being through a wave of the hand, but through stress, conflict and compromise.

The record makes one conclusion clear. The United States has been a devoted, persistent and determined innovator in the field of nuclear energy and nuclear arms control policy. It will continue on this principled course. It can do no less; the stakes are too high, the potential benefits too great.

Eugene V. Rostow
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

IN SEARCH OF PEACE

American Initiatives, 1946-1982

By William H. Lewis

William Lewis is director of the Security Policies Studies Program at George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

The Peace Imperative

In the twilight hours of World War II, statesmen and other foreign-policy thinkers began to ponder the implications of a world with nuclear weapons. For many, the inescapable conclusion was that the nuclear age had made war an unthinkable way to pursue national objectives. Peace was not merely a desirable goal; it was an imperative.

The American leadership accepted the imperative of peace and sought to devise programs to control the destructive new weapons of war. From the Baruch Plan for international control of nuclear power in 1946 to the recent peace initiatives of President Ronald Reagan, the United States has struggled to control the development, deployment, and ultimate use of conventional and nuclear weapons.

The American quest for peace is a theme that links every U.S. administration for three-and-a-half decades. In the 1950's, many observers agreed with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who said, "There is no alternative to peace."

President Ronald Reagan reiterated the dual quest for peace and security at a press conference in Washington, D.C., on March 31, 1982: "Twice in my lifetime I have seen the world plunged into global wars that inflicted untold suffering upon millions of innocent people. I share the determination of today's young people that such a tragedy...must never happen again. My goal is to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically, assuring lasting peace and security."

Fashioning a Security Community

But the hopes and expectations of the United States, and the world, have been met only in part. Since World War II, sophisticated weaponry has multiplied greatly despite the best intentions of international leaders.

In considering this problem, diplomats and other experts have focused on the question of what conditions are necessary for successful arms control negotiations, for implementing international covenants banning the use of force. In short, what are the requirements for peace in a nuclear age?

One answer has been that, to maintain peace among nations, a security community must exist, consisting of international institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure nations that conflict can be resolved peacefully.

Nations everywhere realize that change is the only constant in a turbulent world, and that new economic and political requirements can only be met through peaceful change in an established community of nations.

Despite setbacks, despite a continuing arms competition with the Soviets, the United States has pursued such a vision of peaceful change.

POST-WORLD WAR II ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Antarctic Treaty (1959, multilateral). Provides that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only, prohibiting "any measures of a military nature."

Hot-Line Agreement (1963, bilateral). Establishes direct communications link between the United States and the Soviet Union to facilitate communications and reduce the risk of conflict.

Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963, multilateral). Bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere and in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1966, multilateral). Bans nuclear weaponry from space.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968, multilateral). Signatories agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to nations that do not possess such weapons. States without nuclear weapons agree not to embark on nuclear weapons programs.

Sea-Bed Treaty (1970, multilateral). Prohibits the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on ocean floors or their subsoil.

Hot-Line Modernization Agreement (1971, bilateral). Upgrades original agreement by adding two satellite communications circuits.

Nuclear Accidents Agreement (1971, bilateral). Inaugurates a range of measures to "reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war" between the United States and the Soviet Union, including a pledge to improve safeguards, immediate notification in the event of accident, and advance notice of missile launches toward another's territory.

High-Seas Agreement (1972, bilateral). Adoption of measures to prevent dangerous incidents between the United States and the Soviet Union on or over the high seas.

SALT I ABM Treaty (1972, bilateral). Limits deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Soviet Union and the United States. Updated in 1974 to provide one ABM site for each country.

SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms (1972, bilateral). Treaty essentially freezes strategic ballistic missile launchers, and permits an increase in sea-launched ballistic missiles up to an agreed level. Later version extends agreement to 1980.

Biological Weapons Convention (1972, multilateral). Prohibits development, production and stockpiling of toxin and other biological weapons; requires destruction of existing inventories.

Nuclear War Prevention Agreement (1973, bilateral). Adopts selected measures to help avert nuclear war in crisis situations.

Preliminary Agreement on Formula to Limit Offensive Strategic Weapons (1974, bilateral). Presidents Ford and Brezhnev agree on a ceiling of 2,400 ICBMs for each side, of which only 1,320 can have multiple warheads. (They reach no agreement, however, on other weapons systems such as cruise missiles and bombers.)

Environmental Modification Convention (1977, multilateral). Prohibits introduction of environmental modification measures for military or hostile purposes.

First Efforts to Control Nuclear Weapons

Bernard Baruch (center), U.S. delegate to the first U.N. Atomic Energy Commission meeting in 1946, presents a U.S. proposal bearing his name that would have outlawed atomic weapons and encouraged international development of peaceful uses for atomic energy.

From the inception of the "atomic age," the United States has taken the lead in proposing realistic initiatives for limitation and control of nuclear arms. In international forums and in direct discussions with other states, the United States has sought major reductions in nuclear and conventional forces leading to equal agreed limits on both sides. The Reagan Administration has declared its commitment to these goals as well.

It is essential to understand the historical context of U.S. peace efforts. The economy of the United States did not sustain significant damage during World War II, nor did its people suffer the trauma of witnessing their homes transformed into battlefields. The United States emerged from the global conflict unrivaled in its military, economic and technological power, and it approached the conclusion of the war in a mood bordering on the euphoric. As President Franklin Roosevelt's adviser, Harry Hopkins, later noted:

We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of a new day.... We were absolutely certain that we had won the first great victory of the peace—and, by 'we,' I mean all of us, the whole civilized human race.

The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, expressed himself in equally optimistic terms. "There will no longer be need for spheres of influence," he declared, "for alliances, balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interests."

Although the United States possessed a monopoly in atomic weaponry, American leadership was prepared to give up this advantage, and apply atomic power to nonmilitary uses. Further, U.S. peace initiatives were not limited to nuclear weapons: Officials frequently appealed for mutual cooperation in a number of fields, including offers to extend the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery to the war-devastated Soviet Union—a proposal rejected by Joseph Stalin.

On September 11, 1945, the United States Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, presented Harry S Truman with an early proposal for international control of atomic energy:

If the atomic bomb was merely another, though devastating, military weapon...it would be one thing.... But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts.... It really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control—his moral power.....

Following Stimson's proposal, President Truman offered to cooperate with the Soviet Union and European nations in establishing controls over this new weapon, and to dedicate the efforts of all concerned to nuclear research "for commercial and humanitarian purposes."

America's first comprehensive and detailed proposal for nuclear arms control was the 1946 Baruch Plan, named for Bernard Baruch, a frequent adviser to American Presidents and the U.S. delegate to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Under terms of the Baruch Plan, the United States offered to harness atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and to share such knowledge with the Soviet Union. In the words of one architect closely associated with the Plan:

In plain words, it sets up a plan under which no nation would make atomic bombs.... All dangerous activities would be carried on—not merely inspected—by a live, functioning international Authority with a real purpose in the world and capable of attracting competent personnel. This monopoly of the dangerous activities by an international Authority would still leave a large and tremendously productive field of safe *activities open to individual nations, their industries and universities...*

The Soviet leadership rejected this offer. Despite such setbacks, the United States, and other nations, continued their efforts.

The NATO Security Community

As the United States sought to engage the Soviet Union in meaningful arms negotiations, it also began fashioning a security community among Western nations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, founded in 1949, was the product of frustrated expectations concerning the Soviet Union. The procession of shocks and crises after World War II—including civil war in Greece, the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the Soviet blockade of Berlin (1948-49)—all attested to the refusal of the Soviet Union to become a full partner in guaranteeing international peace and security. Instead, the Soviet Union viewed the world in terms of political and ideological competition with the democracies of the West. The West formed a security coalition of democratic nations because that seemed to be the only realistic response to Soviet political and military actions.

NATO was founded on the principle of common defense, and remains to this day a purely voluntary organization whose goal is to maintain closely coordinated security co-

operation. The members of NATO have no territorial claims against the Soviet Union, seek no military advantages, and eschew any effort to gain political hegemony outside the Atlantic community. NATO forces have never fired upon the Soviet Union or any of its allies.

The Western allies in general, and the United States in particular, did not view the formation of NATO as signaling the collapse of efforts to achieve a basis for peaceful accommodation and cooperation with the Soviet Union. To divide international society for all time into two warring camps is contrary to the philosophical orientation and modern values of Western civilization. Thus, while seeking to bolster the security of the NATO allies, the United States continually has sought to enlist the Soviet Union in arms control negotiations, as well as in efforts to secure agreement on rules of conduct in times of crisis. In all these efforts, the U.S. government has insisted that all agreements meet three fundamental criteria—that they be practical, achievable and verifiable.



President Dwight Eisenhower (below) presents "Atoms for Peace" plan to the U.N. General Assembly on December 8, 1953, calling for creation of an international atomic energy agency. The Eisenhower Administration introduced several major peace proposals, such as "Open Skies," which contained provisions for aerial reconnaissance to protect nations against military buildups.

The Eisenhower Initiatives

In his first inaugural address, on January 20, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared that the United States was prepared to engage in joint efforts to remove the causes of mutual fear and mistrust among nations. By establishing a secure peace for all, the President continued, drastic reduction of armaments would be possible. In an address two months later, the President proposed that all nations establish limits on strategic materials to be produced for military purposes. The resulting savings would be allocated to an international fund for economic aid and reconstruction.

President Eisenhower followed these recommendations with an "Atoms for Peace" plan, presented to the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953, that incorporated his proposal for creation of an international atomic energy agency. The agency would receive contributions of nuclear materials to be used for peaceful purposes. Several months later, the President signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which encouraged the development of commercial nuclear power.

In addition, the Eisenhower Administration actively pursued the possibility of negotiating a halt to nuclear testing; and at a Geneva conference with the heads of Britain, France and the Soviet Union in 1955, President Eisenhower offered his innovative "Open Skies" proposal. The "Open Skies" idea envisaged exchanges of military blueprints, plus aerial reconnaissance, to protect nations against surprise attack—and to serve as a first step toward comprehensive disarmament.

Despite Soviet rejection, the Eisenhower Administration persisted in its peace efforts. In 1957, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, presented a memorandum to a committee of the General Assembly, embracing the following proposals on disarmament:

a. future nuclear production would be restricted to peaceful purposes under adequate inspection;
b. action would be taken at a future date to reduce military stockpiles;
c. with effective control established over production of nuclear materials, nuclear testing would be eliminated;
d. first-stage reductions in conventional forces of the so-called "Big Four" nations that would limit the United States and Soviet Union to 2.5 million men, the United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men;
e. further reductions would depend on political settlements on the part of the "Big Four."

Parity and Deterrence

United States peace initiatives in the 1960's reflected a combination of hope and realism. U.S. officials continued to formulate proposals to control and reduce nuclear weapons, and to maintain NATO. Out of this effort evolved two key concepts: parity and deterrence.

The NATO allies recognized that the virtually irresistible drive of modern technology was generating new and yet more threatening weapons of human destruction. In Washington, London, Bonn and elsewhere, policymakers sought to give substance to the impulse for security—and avoid an escalating arms race—through bilateral negotiations and through multilateral protocols of mutual restraint. A succession of American leaders concluded that, despite U.S. improvements in many strategic weapons, the most constructive approach would be to avoid

seeking superiority in nuclear weapons and to accept a condition of strategic equivalence, or parity, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Parity became an accepted tenet of American policy as the decade of the 60's came to a close.

The policy of deterrence has been a subject of long and intense debate. Occasionally the debate has reflected a basic misunderstanding of NATO policy and intent. Concepts of deterrence did not originate in the nuclear age. Peoples throughout history have sought to discourage adversaries from taking hostile actions. At the strategic, or nuclear, level, deterrence means the prospect of such severe retaliation that an adversary is discouraged from initiating an attack. Within NATO, deterrence requires that member nations employ sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to present potential adversaries with risks and costs that overshadow any possible political or military gains. Deterrence does not require total superiority in conventional and nuclear capabilities—and, as the historical record makes clear, the United States and its NATO allies have *never* sought such military superiority.

From the perspective of the United States, deterrence and arms control are not contradictory, but reinforce one another. The West can best achieve progress in negotiations with Moscow if, as in the past, it demonstrates the determination to maintain a stable nuclear balance. The United States and its allies can then advance fresh arms control proposals from a position of strength and equality. In short, deterrence enhances rather than diminishes prospects for significant future progress in arms control and disarmament.

Deterrence has withstood the test of time: Two generations of Europeans and Americans have grown up in peace and economic well-being. But deterrence alone is not enough. The challenge to world statesmen has been to make progress in reducing such weapons through negotiation, while using negotiation as a way to bolster both the sense and the substance of security in an increasingly turbulent world.



Speaking to the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1961, President John Kennedy calls for "comprehensive disarmament," including an immediate test ban and a halt to production of nuclear weapons.

The Kennedy-Johnson Initiatives

While securing a stable nuclear balance between East and West in the '60s, the United States also continued its search for meaningful arms agreements with the Soviets. President Kennedy presented a new American plan for general and complete disarmament to the United Nations on September 21, 1961. The plan contained the following recommendations:

a. conclude an immediate nuclear test ban agreement with adequate on-site verification;
b. end production of nuclear weapons and agree to prevent their transfer to non-nuclear powers;
c. negotiate a treaty that would bar nuclear weapons in outer space;
d. gradually destroy existing nuclear weapons stockpiles and allocate nuclear materials for peaceful uses;
e. end testing and production of delivery systems for strategic nuclear arms, and destroy existing inventories of such weapons;
f. agree to earmark national forces for United Nations peacekeeping duties, as well as promote efforts to improve the operational capabilities of United Nations peacekeeping forces.

On the same day, the Soviets presented their own arms control program. The contrast between the two sets of proposals is illustrative of the different approaches. Premier Nikita Khrushchev urged that "war propaganda" be prohibited by the United Nations, that troops be withdrawn from foreign territory (a perennial Soviet proposal aimed at NATO), that military budgets be frozen, that a

U.S. Senators and foreign policy officials watch as President John Kennedy signs the instruments of ratification for the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Bottom, first page of the Test Ban Treaty; more than 100 nations have signed this multilateral accord.



T R E A T Y
banning nuclear weapon tests
in the atmosphere, in outer
space and under water

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin shake hands after signing 1967 treaty barring nuclear weapons from outer space. Standing between the two are U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk (right) and British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean. Bottom, page of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with signatures of six participating states.

SALT and Detente

President Richard Nixon, left, and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, sign the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) in Moscow, May 26, 1972. The SALT I Treaty sought to reduce the risk of nuclear war by limiting the deployment of both anti- and offensive-missile systems.



nonaggression pact be concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that nuclear-free zones be established. Vague, unverifiable and lacking practical means of implementation, the Soviet statement was more a rhetorical stance than a set of achievable proposals. The Soviet Union startled the international community several weeks later when it exploded a nuclear bomb in the atmosphere estimated at between 50 and 57 megatons, the largest nuclear explosion in history.

The Atlantic Alliance experienced a sense of beleaguerment in the '60s as a result of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia—and an increase in worldwide Soviet arms shipments. Nevertheless, the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Hot-Line Agreement were successfully concluded during the Kennedy Administration, and the landmark Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which established a basis for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, during the Administration of Lyndon Johnson. All served as useful foundations for the arms control initiatives of the '70s.

In the early 1970's, the Administration of Richard Nixon saw an urgent need to accommodate Soviet and American security concerns. The prospect of continuing confrontation carried with it nuclear perils. President Nixon regarded the growing nuclear arsenals as a hazard that no longer could be contained through an uneasy equilibrium. In the interests of peace and security, for itself and for the world community as well, the United States accepted a posture of "strategic equivalence" with the Soviet Union. The President noted in his first foreign affairs report: "We were determined not to lurch along—with isolated agreements vulnerable to sudden shifts of course in political relations, with peaks and valleys based on atmosphere, with incessant tension and maneuvering."

In a major foreign policy initiative, President Nixon built on common interests between the United States and the Soviet Union. Through intense diplomatic contact and consultation, the United States sought to establish procedures for crisis management, expand cultural exchange agreements and open new doors to American goods and technology. At the same time, the President clearly expressed the willingness of the United States to accept strategic "parity" in nuclear weaponry.

With this perception the Nixon Administration entered into the first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The result was a major two-part treaty in 1972: One part limited deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM); the other provided for interim limits on offensive nuclear missiles. The SALT agreements sought to place limits on the size and capability of strategic forces, and to reduce the likelihood of surprise attack. Provisions for verification by both parties (primarily through satellite photography) were critical to the success of SALT I. Indeed, adequate verification has been a primary U.S. objective throughout the SALT negotiations. From the U.S. point of view, verification will remain a top-priority objective in current and future efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals, because without it, mutual trust cannot exist.

Despite the success of SALT I, the Soviet Union in the 1970's did not reciprocate the willingness of the U.S. government, stated publicly and repeatedly, to accept a condition of strategic balance. Instead, the Soviets undertook a massive peacetime military buildup. The Soviets have:
—developed and deployed heavy, accurate, intercontinental ballistic missile systems capable of destroying American land-based systems in a pre-emptive strike;
—created a second-strike capability;
—developed intermediate nuclear weapons capable of striking Western Europe within minutes after being launched from the Soviet Union; and
—enhanced Soviet conventional forces in firepower, mobility and geographic reach far beyond any reasonable national security requirements.

Unrealized expectations contributed in part to the disillusionment felt in official American circles by the end of the 1970's. Eugene V. Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), commented:



Portion of final page from SALT I Treaty with signatures of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers.



IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this third day of October in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred

By the President:

Secretary of State

Ten years ago American experts and officials assured our people that the Soviet Union was seeking nuclear parity, recognition as a great power, and a place in the political sun. But the Soviet Union has gone right on building up its nuclear arsenal at the rate of some eight percent a year in real terms, although all students of the subject agree it has long since passed the point of nuclear parity.

In the late '60s, the Soviets augmented their deployments in Eastern Europe at a time when the numbers of U.S. troops in Western Europe remained constant, and even declined. U.S. nuclear forces in Western Europe stabilized in quantity and quality, while Soviet forces tended to increase in both categories. The Soviet Union demonstrated a willingness to exercise restraint only when specific and verifiable arms control agreements had been negotiated.

The Soviet leadership has often claimed that it is driven in the military field by the desire to keep pace with American technological superiority. Available evidence, however, casts doubt on the official Soviet rationale. The Soviets, for example, deployed the first intermediate-range ballistic missiles and the first intercontinental ballistic missiles; they also installed the first anti-ballistic missile defenses. These actions reflect a Soviet determination to foster a military establishment capable of offensive as well as defensive warfare.

The history of SALT II underscores the fragility of arms control efforts when mutual confidence between the negotiating parties is lacking. In essence, SALT II was an agreement to maintain the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States in nuclear weapons.

Presidents Gerald Ford and Leonid Brezhnev met at Vladivostok in November 1974 and reached general agreement on ceilings for intercontinental ballistic missiles, including missiles with multiple warheads. They were unable, however, to resolve questions of verification, or to set limits on cruise missiles and Soviet bombers. The ensuing negotiations were lengthy and difficult, in part because of the complexity of trying to control qualitative, technological changes in nuclear weapons as well as sheer numbers.

Below, at 1974 summit meeting in Vladivostok, Presidents Gerald Ford (left) and Leonid Brezhnev sign a communique announcing general agreement on limits for strategic nuclear weapons.

In the end, the two nations reached agreement on SALT II, only to encounter a more fundamental difficulty over Soviet actions outside the nuclear arena. By invading Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviets reinforced the doubts of many in the United States about the sincerity of the Soviet commitment to peace. At the same time, many Americans became increasingly critical of the decade-long Soviet nuclear military buildup. In an atmosphere of rising distrust and concern about Soviet motives and policies, SALT II lost any chance for the U.S. Senate to give its advice and consent as required by the U.S. Constitution. The United States and the Soviet Union continue to abide by the terms of the treaty tacitly. It is clear, however, that for the United States, arms control efforts are, and will be, affected by the state of U.S.-Soviet relations generally.

MAJOR U.S. PEACE INITIATIVES

June 14, 1946. Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, proposes creation of an international Authority to conduct all phases of atomic energy research and development, including direct control of potentially dangerous atomic activities. The Authority would be empowered to inspect for violations of the treaty provisions.

April 16, 1953. In a speech entitled "Chance for Peace," President Dwight Eisenhower proposes that nations set limits on the portion of total production of strategic materials devoted to the military. He further suggests that the savings be placed in a fund for worldwide assistance.

December 8, 1953. President Eisenhower presents his "Atoms for Peace" in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, calling for creation of an international atomic energy agency that would receive allocations of nuclear materials from individual states and use them for peaceful purposes.

August 30, 1954. The U.S. Congress passes, and President Eisenhower signs, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, authorizing the international exchange of information for peaceful uses of atomic energy.

July 21, 1955. President Eisenhower delivers his "Open Skies" proposal, designed to protect nations against threatening military buildups and surprise attacks. His detailed proposals include exchange of blueprints of military establishments and aerial reconnaissance as a first step toward comprehensive disarmament.

January 14, 1957. Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., sets forth comprehensive arms-control and force-limitation proposals. These include: restriction of nuclear production to peaceful uses with adequate inspection; staged reduction of nuclear stockpiles; eventual halt to nuclear tests; reduction in the armed forces of the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France to specified levels with provisions for aerial and ground inspections; and establishment of an international armaments agency.

October 31, 1958. The United States unilaterally suspends nuclear-weapons testing for a period of one year.

September 25, 1961. President John Kennedy offers a U.S. plan for general and complete disarmament to the U.N., calling for an immediate test ban, halt to production of nuclear weapons, ban on nuclear weapons in outer space, gradual elimination of nuclear stockpiles, and improvements in the functioning of U.N. peacekeeping forces.

April 18, 1962. The United States presents a comprehensive, three-stage disarmament proposal that envisages: one, a reduction and ceiling on nuclear and conventional forces, test ban and other measures; two, further 50 percent cut in delivery systems and other arms; and three, reduction of arms and forces to levels necessary for internal order, elimination of nuclear weapons and strengthening of U.N. peacekeeping forces.

August 17, 1965. The United States submits a draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty to the U.N. Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee.

March 18, 1969. The American delegation to the Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee initiates study of a ban on nuclear weapons on the ocean floor.

November 25, 1969. President Richard Nixon states that the United States unilaterally renounces the first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons, and renounces all methods of biological warfare.

April 13, 1976. The United States proposes a ban on further production of chemical weapons and reductions in existing stockpiles.

March 1977. In Moscow, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposes deep cuts in the numbers of strategic nuclear arms, plus constraints on qualitative improvements for such weapons.

November 18, 1981. President Ronald Reagan proposes a "Zero Option" for intermediate nuclear arms in Europe under which the United States and NATO would cancel deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviet Union dismantles its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.

May 9, 1982. President Reagan issues a call for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and proposes a one-third cut in strategic nuclear warheads for the Soviet Union and the United States. Under terms of the plan, both sides would have equal numbers of warheads and missile launchers, of which no more than half could be land-based. In a second phase, both nations would equalize the payloads, or "throw weight," of their missile forces.

Multilateral Efforts

While international attention has tended to focus on bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons, America has launched a number of peace initiatives through multilateral channels. The United Nations Committee on Disarmament, organized in 1979, has been one principal venue for such peace efforts; examples include discussions on a treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and efforts at preventative arms control—e.g., banning radiological weapons.

U.S. delegates also have presented a number of other arms control initiatives, including proposals for comprehensive disarmament, control of conventional arms and reductions in military expenditures. Recently, ACDA Director Eugene Rostow addressed the Disarmament Committee and called on all member states to uphold the ban of the U.N. Charter on the threat or use of force in international relations. He noted that, should that provision of the Charter become a dead letter, the quest for disarmament "would become a quixotic or utopian activity."

The United States has explored other ways of limiting conventional arms as well. In Vienna, for example, U.S. diplomats continue to participate in negotiations, termed the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, to reduce the size of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

President Jimmy Carter, aware that the growing trade in conventional arms threatened a volatile world, launched a bold initiative in 1977 to curtail the flow of sophisticated weapons to less-developed countries. He announced a curtailment in American sales abroad through the establishment of stricter governmental controls and annual "dollar ceilings," which represented a unilateral act of self-restraint. Further, the President urged other major producers of conventional weapons systems to adopt comparable export control policies.

Shortly thereafter, the U.S. government entered into Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks with the Soviet Union to secure Soviet agreement to a "regime of joint restraint." U.S. and Soviet officials held four major meetings, but registered little substantive progress. In fact, Soviet arms deliveries to less-developed nations grew prodigiously even after the talks began, and with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both parties agreed to terminate them. The Soviet Union is today the leading exporter of conventional weapons to less-developed countries.

The scope of American involvement in international peacekeeping parallels its multinational efforts on arms control. In the Middle East, the United States played a singular role in facilitating the historic Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. The United States provides financial backing for U.N. peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon, as well as funds and personnel for the Multilateral and Observer Force in the Sinai, established under the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. At the same time, the United States has been an active participant in international efforts to win independence and majority rule in Namibia, to secure the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, and to provide humanitarian aid for refugees from Somalia to Southeast Asia.

Regional agreements offer opportunities for building new security communities. The United States has strongly supported such diplomatic explorations, including the feasibility of freezes on military personnel, reductions in military budgets, regional nonaggression pledges, and limits on the introduction of new generations or types of weaponry.

The Declaration of Ayacucho in December 1974 by the eight Andean countries is an example of one promising security approach. At that time, Peru proposed that the members of the Andean group negotiate specific limits on the acquisition of offensive armaments. This was a sound principle, one which found ultimate fruition in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The United States strongly supported and, on May 26, 1977, formally signed Protocol I to the treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America. (The United States Senate approved it on November 13, 1981.) By adhering to the Protocol, the United States undertakes not to test, use, produce, or deploy nuclear weapons anywhere within the zone of the Latin American treaty. The treaty strengthens the cause of nuclear nonproliferation, long an important objective of American foreign policy, and, in the words of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, "demonstrates that patient but imaginative diplomacy can, indeed, advance us toward a more secure future."

New Peace Initiatives

Below, Geneva, December 1981: U.S. arms control and disarmament negotiator, Paul Nitze (left), and Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, shake hands before starting discussions on the limitation of Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe.

As in the past, the United States today follows a foreign policy that is both pragmatic and hopeful. This policy entails the modernization of U.S. forces to maintain deterrent capabilities, and the exploration of opportunities to negotiate reductions in nuclear weaponry with the Soviet Union.

In Europe particularly, the challenge to the United States is to underscore the earnestness of its efforts to slow the pace of nuclear competition, while also encouraging the revitalization of the Atlantic Alliance.

In several recent statements, President Ronald Reagan has made clear that he is prepared to explore every meaningful proposal for arms control or disarmament—directly with the Soviet Union, on a multinational basis, or within regional organizations. As in the past, however, the United States, together with its allies, insists that such proposals must be balanced and verifiable; the United States seeks no military advantages from arms control provisions; neither can it grant such advantages to the Soviet Union.

The issue of balance and relative advantage is at the heart of the current debate over Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe. From 1975 through 1981, the United States deployed no new intermediate-range missiles, and has actually withdrawn 1,000 warheads from Europe. The Soviets, on the other hand, deployed hundreds of warheads on mobile SS-20 missiles.

It was this growing imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear weapons that led the NATO countries to initiate discussions on deployment of comparable U.S. nuclear forces. The result was the 1979 decision to proceed with modernization of NATO nuclear forces while simultaneously conducting arms control talks with the Soviets. This "two-track" approach remains the basis for American policy on INF today.

On November 18, 1981, President Reagan advanced a bold proposal that Washington and Moscow agree to eliminate intermediate nuclear missiles from their arsenals. The Soviet delegation to INF talks in Geneva has since rejected this approach. President Brezhnev, in March 1982, called for a freeze on all *future* deployments of Intermediate Nuclear Forces, a proposal rejected by the United States, since the presence of such intermediate-range missiles already in the Soviet arsenal accords the Soviet Union a significant advantage in this field.

Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration has determined that a two-track approach to negotiated security is both prudent and desirable. The first track emphasizes nuclear parity and deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; the second is a continuing commitment to negotiations with the Soviet Union on the interrelated issues of intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the President's "Zero-Option" proposal, the United States is prepared to cancel its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviet Union will agree to dismantle its SS-20 and other intermediate-range missiles.

President Reagan followed his "Zero Option" plan with a call for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). On May 9, 1982, the President returned to Eureka College in Illinois, from which he had graduated 50 years earlier, to offer a new arms control initiative aimed at major reductions in Soviet and American strategic nuclear arsenals. He proposed that, as a first step, both nations cut the number of strategic nuclear warheads by a third, from about 7,500 on each side to 5,000.

In addition, each nation would be limited to a total of 850 intercontinental ballistic missiles, of which no more than half could be land-based. In a second phase, the United States and the Soviet Union would equalize the payloads, or "throw weight," of their strategic missile forces. The President stated:

The monumental task of reducing and reshaping our strategic forces to enhance stability will take many years of concentrated effort. But I believe that it will be possible to reduce the risks of war by removing the instabilities that now exist and by dismantling the nuclear menace.



President Ronald Reagan announces his "Zero Option" peace proposal for intermediate-range missiles in an address on November 18, 1981. In a major initiative six months later, on May 9, 1982, the President called for a one-third cut in strategic missile warheads by the United States and the Soviet Union.

A Continuing Commitment to Peace



After more than three-and-a-half decades of intensive negotiations, the United States can point to a record of achievement in the search for peace. At the same time, however, international rivalries have not abated. Nations continue to rely on individual military establishments for their security, and the global community has not yet found the combination of political agreements and institutional forces necessary for international peace and effective control of arms.

Although U.S. efforts at arms control—beginning virtually from the first days when it commanded a nuclear monopoly—have widened to cover outer space and the seabed as well as issues of non-proliferation, the number of nations with the capacity to develop nuclear weapons has expanded. At the same time, the capabilities and accuracy of weapons systems has grown enormously.

The United States is meeting this present-day nuclear challenge by formulating and advancing new proposals within the framework of a commitment to arms reductions, and a policy of deterrence and strategic parity.

Within this policy framework, American officials seek to: deter conflict rather than accept the use of these weapons in the conduct of war; search for strategic stability rather than superiority; and pursue an arms control negotiating process which will enhance international order and stability. In short, for more than three decades, American Presidents, and U.S. foreign policy officials have held to the view that nuclear weapons have "utility only in nonuse."

Americans view war as an aberration in the natural order, and this perspective has dictated a continuing search for peace and security through negotiation. Americans continue to place reliance on reason, and on the necessity of reasonable men and women to resolve their differences peacefully. Despite repeated disappointments, the United States continues to participate actively in multilateral conferences dealing with a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons, a limit on the production of chemical and radiological weapons, and a strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation guarantees. At the same time, the United States seeks to devise means for verifying adherence to existing and future international treaties and agreements.

Whatever the outcome of present and future negotiations, the record of past American endeavors makes clear the dedication of U.S. leaders to a stable and peaceful world—one in which all nations can live in a common security community, a community of enduring peace.

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